This essay tracks the concept of militant democracy in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, where it has migrated from a principle that authorizes a state to act in a militant manner to preserve democratic processes to one that entitles a state to establish perimeters and guard against threats of a different kind. Militant democracy now authorizes a state to assume a militant stance toward the exercise of religious freedom that threatens substantive conceptions of democracy instantiated in its constitutional order. The essay identifies four substantive conceptions of democracy -liberal democracy, secular democracy, republican democracy, and conservative democracy -to which militant democracy has migrated in recent years. It argues that militant democracy's migration signals an ominous shift in the way in which the European Court of Human Rights comprehends the relationship between religion and state power.
Introduction
When he was a young boy, my son had a collection of stuffed animals -a dog, a wolf, a cat, a lion, a tiger, and a bear -that he liked to play with in bed before going to sleep.
One night, after I said goodnight to him, he carefully arranged the animals facing outward around him. When I asked him what he was doing, he said, "guarding the perimeter." For him, the perimeter was simple. It was his bed. For the rest of us, however, the perimeter is more complicated -as is how to guard it.
Militant democracy -a form of constitutional democracy authorized to protect civil and political freedoms by preemptively restricting their exercise -is one way of guarding one perimeter. The perimeter guarded by a militant democracy, traditionally understood, is the boundary of the democratic character of a constitutional order. But militant democracies are not simply constitutional democracies. Militant democracy refers to preemptive stances that a constitutional democracy assumes towards members who exercise civil and political freedom in ways that threaten its democratic existence. The classic scenario is one where an extremist political party participates in a general election on a platform that proposes dismantling constitutional arrangements that entrench democratic self-rule. In non-militant democracies, such threats are typically addressed by judicial review of the constitutionality of actions that threaten democratic self-rule if and when such a political party actually assumes office and introduces legislation to this effect. By banning the party in question, placing content restrictions on electoral speech, or excluding the party in question from the electoral arena, a militant democracy operates preemptively to ensure that this scenario doesn't come to pass. Court of Human Rights, where it appears to have migrated from a principle that authorizes a state to act in a militant manner to preserve democratic processes to one that entitles a state to establish perimeters and guard against threats of a different kind.
Militant democracy now authorizes a state to assume a militant stance toward the exercise of religious freedom that threatens substantive conceptions of democracy instantiated in its constitutional order. 5 Some of this migration has to do with ambiguities inherent in legal technologies deployed to determine the legality of militant measures. One such technology -the margin of appreciation -calibrates the extent of discretion that national authorities enjoy, when balancing interests associated with
Convention rights and freedoms with countervailing state objectives, according to the gravity of the threat to Convention values posed by the exercise of civil or political freedom. Some of this migration also to do with ambiguities surrounding who belongs to a political community and who doesn't. But most of it has to do with ambiguities surrounding the concept of democracy itself.
After describing the Court's approach to militant measures that seek to preserve what might be called procedural conceptions of democracy, the essay identifies four substantive conceptions of democracy -liberal democracy, secular democracy, republican democracy, and conservative democracy -to which militant democracy has migrated in recent years. The migration of militant democracy, I argue, signals an ominous shift in the way in which the European Court of Human Rights comprehends the relationship between religion and state power. Instead of treating the protection of religious freedom as essential to democracy, the Court has begun to reframe religious freedom as a threat to democracy and immunize states from judicial oversight when they take preemptive measures to curb its exercise.
I. Militant Democracy
Constitutional expression of militant democracy first occurred in Europe as a foundational principle of post-war West Germany. 6 Drafted against the backdrop of the collapse of the democratic Weimar Republic and World War II, the German constitution authorizes the state to regulate and in some circumstances prohibit political activities, associations and movements that threaten Germany's "free basic democratic order." and other organizations devoted to totalitarianism or racial or national hatred. 9 The
Ukrainian constitution authorizes the prohibition of parties that threaten the independence of the state. 10 The Bulgarian constitution prohibits the formation of political parties on the basis of ethnicity. 11 The Spanish constitution guarantees freedom of association but authorizes the state to declare an association illegal if its goals or means are criminal or it is of a secret or paramilitary nature. 12 More generally worded constitutional provisions are also often capable of being interpreted to authorize the enactment of militant legislative measures that infringe civil and political freedom in the name of democratic self-preservation. when Europe itself appears to be evolving into its own constitutional order.
14 Defining the legal contours of militant democracy is a first order task for national courts to the extent they bear the constitutional responsibility for policing the exercise of legislative and executive power. In Europe, however, it is also a second order task for the Court held that a transformative political agenda must be compatible with "fundamental democratic principles" and the means chosen to implement such an agenda themselves must be "legal" and "democratic." 22 A political party whose platform amounted to little more than claims that "citizens of Kurdish origin were not free to use their own language and were unable to make political demands based on the principle of self-determination, and the security forces campaigning against pro-Kurdish terrorist organisations were committing illegal acts and were responsible in part for the suffering of Kurdish citizens in certain parts of Turkey" could not be said to threaten Turkish democracy. 23 The Court has also reviewed militant measures aimed at party officials. In Vajnai v.
Hungary, the Court held Hungary in violation of Article 10's guarantee of freedom of expression for arresting and convicting the vice-president of the Worker's Party, a left wing political party, for wearing a "totalitarian symbol" (a five-pointed red star) when speaking to supporters at a lawful demonstration. 24 The Court stated that it was 
II. Militant Liberalism
The unanimously upheld the Chamber's ruling, stating that "it is not at all improbable that totalitarian movements, organized in the form of democratic parties, might do away with democracy, after prospering under a democratic regime, there being examples of this in modern European history." 34 It further held that state authorities possess a right to protect state institutions from an association that, through its activities, jeopardizes democracy. 35 Specifically, the Court held that the ban was a justifiable interference with the Convention guarantee of freedom of association because it pursued a legitimate aim and was "necessary in a democratic society." 36 The Court further held that a state can act in a militant manner -what it termed as the "power of preventive intervention" -before a party assumes power and begins to implement an antidemocratic agenda "through concrete steps that might prejudice civil peace and the country's democratic regime." 37 Elsewhere in its judgment the Court held that the state is entitled to act when the threat to democracy is "sufficiently imminent." 38 It defended this conclusion by stating that it is consistent with Article 1 of the Convention, which imposes on states a positive state obligation to secure the rights and freedoms of individuals within its jurisdiction. and early 1980s, the number of university students wearing head scarves increased substantially and in 1984, the ban was extended to prohibit the wearing of head scarves by university students.
In Şahin v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights was asked to rule on whether the ban on the wearing of head scarves by university students was consistent with Article 9 of the European Convention, which guarantees freedom of religion. 44 Leyla
Şahin was a fifth-year female medical student at the faculty of medicine of the University of Istanbul. She brought a suit against Turkey for upholding the decision of the University to prohibit her from taking exams or attending lectures while wearing her head scarf. In Şahin v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban, stating that "in democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on freedom to manifest one's religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone's beliefs are respected." 45 In its reasons, the Court emphasized that the right to freedom of religion "is one of the foundations of a democratic society" and that "the pluralism indissociable from a democratic society...depends on it." 46 Consistent with prior holdings, however, the Court declared that that "Article 9 does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or a belief and does not in all cases guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is dictated by a belief." 47 And, as it has done in several cases in the past, 48 it ducked the issue of whether wearing a head scarf constitutes a form of religious "practice" -a thorny issue for the Court given its stance that only acts dictated by religious duty constitute practices protected by Article 9 49 -by assuming without deciding that wearing a headscarf received Article 9 protection. It was able to do so because it went on to hold that that the ban was in pursuance of a legitimate aim and was "necessary in a democratic society." 50 As is also typical in many Article 9 cases, 51 it noted that rules governing religious practices "vary from country to country according to national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order." 52 It accordingly granted Turkey a relatively wide margin of appreciation concerning the necessity of the ban, requiring only that it establish "a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the ban and its objective of preserving the secular nature of the university" 53 -a test easily met on the facts.
On its surface, the Court's decision in Şahin appears to be a relatively straightforward application of its jurisprudence on freedom of religion -a jurisprudence that emphasizes the need to provide states with a wide margin of appreciation in relation to measures that seek to reconcile religious freedom with competing interests. 54 Yet, while this theme of reconciliation dominates the Court's reasons, another, very different theme -one of militancy -also informs the Court's judgment. The Court offered additional reasons for concluding that the ban on headscarves does not violate Article 9 similar to those offered in Refah. It stated that "upholding the principle of secularism … may be considered necessary to protect the democratic system in Turkey." 55 And it quoted with approval a passage from the reasons of the Chamber below, which, after
citing Refah, appears to characterize the head scarf ban as a measure that constitutes "a stance" against "extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts." 56 It is precisely this linkage that Judge Tulkens, in her dissenting judgment in Şahin,
decried:
While everyone agrees on the need to prevent radical Islamism, a serious objection may nevertheless be made to such reasoning. Merely wearing the headscarf cannot be associated with fundamentalism and it is vital to distinguish between those who wear the headscarf and "extremists" who seek to impose the headscarf as they do other religious symbols. Not all women who wear the headscarf are fundamentalists and there is nothing to suggest that the applicant held fundamentalist views. She is a young adult woman and a university student, and might reasonably be expected to have a heightened capacity to resist pressure, it being noted in this connection that the judgment fails to provide any concrete example of the type of pressure concerned. The applicant's personal interest in exercising the right to freedom of religion and to manifest her religion by an external symbol cannot be wholly absorbed by the public interest in fighting extremism.
Judge Tulkens is surely right to question the merits of automatically equating the wearing of a head scarf and religious fundamentalism. But the more important point is that characterizing the head scarf ban in this way means that it is not only a measure designed to promote secularism but it is also a preemptive measure taken by the state secularism is an outer democratic perimeter guarded to prevent against breach of democracy's inner liberalism.
IV. Militant Republicanism
Like liberalism, republicanism means many things to many people. Unlike liberalism, however, republicanism does not place liberty at the normative centre of a political community. Instead, republicanism valorizes civic virtue and the public good. In France, it assumes particular content with a conception of the Republic as "a 'color blind' arena in which the defense of the 'general interest' is meant to triumph over parochialism and private interests." 58 In the words of Cécile Laborde, "the French tradition of the autonomy of the state, complemented after the Revolution by the republican ideal of a self-governing people democratically establishing the terms of its constitution, strongly rejected the 'heteronomy' involved in subjecting political authority to religious institutions, transcendental foundations and revealed truth." In Dogru v. France, the Court addressed some of these questions. At issue was a decision by a state secondary school in France to expel an eleven year old Muslim girl for refusing to remove her head scarf during physical education classes. 61 The decision was based on the school's rule that "discreet signs manifesting the pupil's … religious convictions shall be accepted in the establishment" but that all pupils must attend physical education classes in "sports clothes." 62 This rule was consistent with Conseil d'Etat jurisprudence which held that students should not be allowed:
To display signs of religious affiliation, which, inherently, in the circumstances in which they are worn, individually or collectively, or conspicuously or as a means of protest, might constitute a form of pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda, undermine the dignity or freedom of the pupil or other members of the educational community, compromise their health or safety, disrupt the conduct of teaching activities and the educational role of the teachers, or, lastly, interfere with order in the school or the normal functioning of the public serve.
63
In this vein, the Conseil d'Etat had annulled strict bans in schools on the wearing of any distinctive religious signs on the basis that they were worded too generally. 64 It also held that a student could not be penalized for wearing a head scarf if it did not amount to an act of pressure or proselytism or interfered with public order in the school. Although not expressly stated by the Court, the particular "concession" at issue in Dogru, of course, is that an eleven year old girl take off her head scarf during physical education class. Why the "dialogue and compromise" that inheres in "pluralism and democracy" requires this particular concession is not explained by the Court. Instead, the Court reiterates that, in cases like Dogru, "where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely," the state enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in relation to striking an appropriate balance among the competing interests at play. 68 On the one hand, the Court noted with approval that the ban in question was not absolute; the applicant was free to wear her head scarf in her other classes. On the other hand, the Court did not offer any explanation as to why wearing a head scarf in a physical education class was, as claimed by the state, "incompatible with sports classes for reasons of health or safety" 69 or why wearing a hat instead, as proposed by the applicant, was an unacceptable alternative. Answers to these questions, according to the Court, fall "squarely within the margin of appreciation of the State." France during the past decades, the living conditions in many suburbs of our towns, unemployment, the feeling experienced by many people living in France that they are the subject of discrimination, or are even being driven out of the national community; these people explain that they thus lend an ear to those who incite them to fight what we call the values of the Republic. .... In this context it is natural that many of our fellow citizens demand the restoration of Republican authority and especially in schools. It is with these threats in mind and in the light of the values of our Republic that we have formulated the proposals set out in this report. ... [Regarding the head scarf, the report states that] for the school community ... the visibility of a religious sign is perceived by many as contrary to the role of school, which should remain a neutral forum and a place where the development of critical faculties is encouraged. It also infringes the principles and values that schools are there to teach, in particular, equality between men and women. 72 In light of these "threats" to "the values of the Republic," the Stasi Commission's report led to legislation in 2004 banning students from wearing head scarves in primary and secondary schools. 73 Duly noting the 2004 legislation, the Court went on to characterize secularism as "a constitutional principle" in France, and "a founding principle of the Republic, to which the entire population adheres and the protection of which appears to be of prime importance, in particular in schools." 74 The Court then quoted a passage from Refahone overlooked by many commentators no doubt due to the fact that it was addressing freedom of religion when the main thrust of the decision was in relation to freedom of association. In rejecting Refah Party's subsidiary claim that the party ban violated religious freedom, the Court had held that "an attitude which fails to respect that principle [of secularism] will not necessarily be accepted as being covered by the freedom to manifest one's religion and will not enjoy the protection of Article 9 of the Convention." 75 In Dogru, the Court reiterated this holding, concluding that "religious freedom thus recognized and restricted by the requirements of secularism appears legitimate in light of the values underpinning the Convention." In recognition of this fact, female students were given the option of wearing a shalmar kameeze, a smock like dress combined with loose trousers, as well as a head scarf of a specified colour and quality. Shabina Begum was a 14 year old student who had worn the shalmar kameeze to school for two years, but, at the start of a new school year, had requested that she be allowed to wear a more modest coat-like garment known as the jilbab, which concealed, to a greater extent than the shalmar kameeze, the coutours of her body. The school refused her permission, and eventually she sought judicial review of the school's decision, alleging that it was in breach of Article 9. The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that she held a sincere belief that her religion required her to wear a jilbab on attaining puberty and that the school's rules were not "necessary in a democratic society" as required by Article 9 of the Convention. 80 The House of Lords overturned the Court of Appeal's decision. 81 Lords Bingham, Hoffman and Scott, in separate reasons, held that the regulation did not interfere with
Begum's religious freedom, given that she could have attended other schools that permitted the wearing of the jilbab. Lord Hoffman, in particular, ruled that Article 9
"does not require that one should be allowed to manifest one's religion at any time and place of one's choosing." 82 Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale disagreed, reasoning, respectively, that changing schools was disruptive of her education and was a decision not for her but for her parents to make. All judges, however, agreed that had there been an interference with her right to manifest her religion, the school's policy would have been justified under Article 9(2).
The reasons offered by the House of Lords echo the European Court's traditional approach to Article 9 that emphasizes reconciliation, albeit with adjustments that factor out the margin of appreciation that the European Court extends to domestic judicial review. 83 Citing the "valuable guidance" of the European Court's decision in Şahin, Lord
Bingham's reasons refer to:
The need in some situations to restrict freedom to manifest religious belief; the value of religious harmony and tolerance between opposing or competing groups and of pluralism and broadmindedness; the need for compromise and balance; the variation of practice and tradition among member states; and the permissibility in some contexts of 87 Claiming that "Begum displays the unsatisfactory conceptual and argumentative state of contemporary human rights law,"
Finnis argues that the House of Lords failed to explain why the school uniform policy was in response to a "pressing social need" and was the "least restrictive" of the right to manifest one's religious beliefs as required, he believes, by Strasbourg jurisprudence. 88 Finnis argues further that such an explanation can be found in key passages of the To be the matrix for a threat of this kind, a religious culture must have one or more of a cluster of features: a disrespect for equality (here the equality of females, especially girls and young women); a denial of immunity from coercion in religious matters (including matters of apostasy from that religion or rejection of all religion), the immunity now central to Christian political teaching; a mandating, encouragement or permission of intimidation of apostates, backsliders and others; and a treatment of all arenas, educational or political, as in principle subject to threatening pressure, indeed compulsion, in the name of religious truths and precepts and of promoting adherence to them. 93 Wearing Christian religious symbols in school, in other words, does not threaten the rights of others whereas wearing Muslim symbols does constitute such a threat. 94 Finnis doesn't stop here. He argues further that Şahin can only really be understood in light of Refah, and, in particular, the Court's concern that leaders of the Refah party had called for "jihad," which the Court defined as "holy war and the struggle to be waged until the total domination of Islam in society is to be achieved." 95 Confronted with the grave warnings thus issuing from courts of great pan-European authority, citizens of countries whose Muslim population is increasing very rapidly by immigration and a relatively high birth rate may ask themselves whether it is prudent, or just to the children and grandchildren of everyone in their country, to permit any further migratory increase in that population, or even to accept the presence of immigrant, noncitizen Muslims without deliberating seriously about a possible reversal -humane and financially compensated for and incentivised -of the inflow.
In other words, for Finnis, to conserve England -as England -the state is justified in adopting preemptive measures against the exercise of religious freedom to reverse the tide of not merely public displays of Muslim identity but of Muslim immigration itself.
The perimeter guarded by such measures is the boundary of nothing less than the 
Conclusion
European human rights law traditionally conferred a narrow margin of appreciation toward militant state measures that protect a democracy from threats to its procedural existence. It now also confers a wide margin of appreciation toward measures that protect substantive conceptions of democracy from the exercise of freedom of religion.
The result is that states are immunized from Convention oversight when they -in the name of democracy -take preemptive measures to prevent the exercise of religious freedom. The Court has enabled this migration by abandoning the view that religious freedom is an essential property of democracy -treating it instead as a threat to democracy's existence. As a result, it risks validating measures that take aim at Islam itself, permitting states to exclude individuals from political membership solely on account of their religious affiliation. It emphasised, however, that persons could already be required to remove the full veil in certain circumstances in accordance with generally applicable laws and regulation relating to the verification of identity, uniform requirements in the public service, and the requirement of identification for the purposes of access to places where such identification is deemed necessary to public order. The Conseil also held that the principle of laïcité could not justify any potential ban on the wearing of the full Islamic veil. It noted that the principle of laïcité applies directly to public bodies, which generates an obligation of neutrality for public agents in the exercise of their functions, but
